Description
This is the first scholarly monograph devoted exclusively to the Lausanne Conference of April-September 1949—one of the rare occasions on which Israel and the Arab states were assembled together for peace talks. Basing himself on extensive archival documentation and other original source materials in English, Hebrew, Arabic, and French, Neil Caplan has reconstructed the motives and calculations which lay behind the hardline posturing which Arab and Israeli delegations adopted during the Lausanne talks.
Of particular importance is the behind-the-scenes role played by the United States, which went beyond its participation as one of the three members of the Conciliation Commission. For the United Nations and the United States, the failure of the Lausanne peace process was the first of several episodes demonstrating the real limitations of third-party intervention in the quest for a solution to the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Third-Party Intervention: The United Nations and the United States
Two Tracks and Resolution
Learning from Failure
Chapter 1: Pre-Negotiation
Getting Down to Work
Shuttle Diplomacy
Quest for an Advance Gesture from Israel
Chapter 2: PCC Beirut Conference, March 1949
Chapter 3: Towards Lausanne: Continuing Pressure for an Israeli Gesture
The Shadow of Rhodes
Strains in the Arab Common Front
Chapter 4: Opening the Conference
Maneuvering for Position
Structures and Procedures
Chapter 5: A Basis for Discussion: The Lausanne Protocol, 12 May 1949
Staking Out the Positions: The First Deadlock
Chapter 6: Attempts to Break the Deadlock: Israel's Gaza Offer
Presidential Rebuke to Israel
Israel's Offer to Incorporate the Gaza Scrip
American Good Offices Offered to Israel and Egypt
Chapter 7: June Stalemate and Adjournment
Chapter 8: Activity during the Recess
Fine-tuning of the American, Israeli and Arab Positions
Pursuing the Gaza Proposal
The British Eight-Point Plan
Chapter 9: Resumption of the Conference
Israel's Offer to Repatriate 100,000 Refugees
Chapter 10: Continued Conciliation or Imposed Settlement?
Chapter 11: Winding up the Conference: The PCC
Questionnaire and the Economic Survey Mission
Chapter 12: Lausanne Postscripts
New York Meetings
Lobbying the State Department
Chapter 13: Conclusions
The Attitudes and Positions of the Parties
The Ineffectiveness of the PCC
The US Role
Notes
Sources and Bibliography
Index
About the Author
Neil Caplan is the author of Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917-1925, Futile Diplomacy, Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts, 1913-1948 (2 volumes) and numerous articles on the historical evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
October 1993